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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

llELFIN E. ORTEGA,
Plaintiff and Respondent_,
vs.
PERRY A. THOMAS,
Defendant and .Appellant.

Case
No. 9709

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

S'fATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, as prevailing party below, sharply disputes defendant's Statement of Facts, which reads as
though defendant were the prevailing party.
There were three eyewitnesses to the accident who
were not in either car, and all of them flatly testified
that defendant ran a red light and ran broadside into
plaintiff's car.
Peggy Lynn Day followed defendant over the
'viaduct in her car. She estimated his speed going
through the 3rd West intersection at 20-25 miles per
1
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hour (R. 178, 196). At that intersection and going
across the viaduct she maintained a distance behind him
of about 2-21j2 car lengths, and a similar speed, and
estimated his speed at impact as being about 25 miles
per hour (R. 178, 191, 193). Coming off of the viaduct,
Mrs. Day slowed both because she wished to make a
right turn at 5th West and because the light there was
red against her and defendant. Even so she was 208 feet
behind him at impact, which indicates that defendant
was going faster at impact than she thought (R. 181,
182, 190, 193, 197, 198). From the time the defendant
started down from the viaduct until the collision, the
light was red against him (R. 181-182). The impact was
severe, spinning plaintiff's car around (R. 184, 185, 195,
196).
Joe Archibeque testified that he followed plaintiff's
car in his car, southward on 5th West, approaching the
North Temple Intersection ( R. 205-207) . The light
was green for plaintiff as he entered the intersection and
at the impact (R. 207). Defendant hit plaintiff hard
enough to knock plaintiff's car in a complete circle
(R. 221, 234). He estimated defendant's speed at 3040 miles per hour (R. 241, 242), and plaintiff's at 10
miles per hour (R. 205-207). Mr. Archibeque himself
didn't appreciate danger and was almost involved in the
collision too (R. 208, 209, 230, 235).
The third eyewitness, Bob Garcia, was on the roof
of a corner apartment building at the time of the colliSion (R. 245). He stated that plaintiff had the green

2
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light at in1pact ( R. 249), and the speed of defendant
was -t:>-50 rniles per hour ( R. 250, 258), and plaintiff's
20 rniles per hour (R. 250).
Salt Lake City Police Officer Carl N emelka, testified that defendant left 30 feet of brake marks from all
four wheels prior to impact, and 24 feet of veer marks
after impact (R. 108, 110). He placed the point of impact as 37 feet from the east curb of 5th West and
26 feet from the north curb of North Temple (R. 106),
which is almost in the center of the intersection, in the
northwest quarter.
Salt Lake City Police Officer Oscar Hendrickson
testified that, after taking statements from the defendant, he reran defendant's route at the speeds indicated
by defendant. In more than six tries, he came to a red
light against defendant every time (R. 160-162).
Plaintiff, testifying in his own behalf, said that at
6:20 a.m., he left his home at 624 \Vest 3rd North, Salt
Lake City, Utah, to go to work (R. 357, 358). Driving
south on 5th \Vest, he slowed for a red light at North
Temple, and when he was close to the north pedestrian
lane and gqing four or five miles an hour the light
turned green and he proceeded on into the intersection.
As the light changed he looked east, saw defendant's car
approaching, but it was so far away that he didn't view
it as a hazard (R. 358-361). He looked both ways,
and then, looking east again, saw defendant's car very
close to him, tried to speed up, but hadn't time to get
clear and the collision followed (R. 361, 362, 371, 372).

3
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For defendant, testimony was offered by the defendant himself and his brother Larry. The brother testified that· he didn't know the defendant's speed, see
plaintiff prior to the accident, or see the traffic light
prior to impact, although he did look at it inimediately
after the impact and said it was then green for defendant (R. 482-484).
Defendant testifying in his own behalf, fixed his
speeds at all points approaching the intersection from
two blocks back with precision, but was unable to state
his speed when he applied his brakes or at impact (R.
453, 454). His car travelled about 72 feet during his
reaction time, which would indicate a speed of over 45
miles per hour, just before he braked (R. 457). He said
that he first saw the traffic light when he was near the
top of the 5th West side of the viaduct, which would
be about 400 feet from the intersection, and that the
light was then red (R. 441, 442), but changed to green
when he was about 75 feet from the· intersection (R.
443). On cross examination he admitted that on the day
of the accident he gave Officer Hendrickson a written
statement in which he said he first saw the light about
75 feet from the intersection and didn't see it coming
off the viaduct ( R. 464, 469) .
There was a passenger, Delbert Schuller, in defendant's car, at the time of the accident. Defendant made
no effort to have him present in court or have his depo-.
sition taken, although they had been shipmates (R.
477-479) . This might be because Mr. Schuller could

4
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have been the occupant of defendant's car who immediately after the accident, and before anyone got out of
defendant's car, was the author of a comment to defendant "'\Thy didn't you stop?" (R. 223).

THE JURY WAS ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED.
The instructions, taken as a whole, properly advised
the jury as to the theories of the parties and the law
applicable to the case.
Defendant claims prejudicial error because the
trial court submitted separate instructions on the issues
of defendant's negligence and approximate cause and
plaintiff's contributory negligence and proximate cause.
These instructions are stated correctly at pages 4-6 of
defendant's brief. (Instrs. 12 and 14, R. 56, 58). Defendant contends that they should have been merged into
one instruction.
The pertinent facts are:
( 1) The jury was instructed to consider the Instructions as a whole ( Instrs. 1 and 40, R. 44, 84) .
( 2) Contributory negligence was presented as an

issue in the opening statements, the four days of testimony, the instructions, the closing arguments, and the
additional instruction (Additional Designation to
Record).
( 3) Contributory negligence was clearly covered

in the Instructions. It formed a sandwich around In5
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struction 12, being given in Instruction 14, and in
Instruction 11 (R. 55), which stated that the favored
driver was contributorily negligent if he failed to observe
danger when he should have and had then an opportunity to avoid it. It is defined also in Instruction 4B
(R. 47). Instructions 8, 9, 10, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 22 deal,
in whole or in part, with the duties of favored drivers,
all to the benefit of defendant in light of the evidence.
( 4) The defendant made no request for a definitive
instruction on contributory negligence, nor to point out
to the court that he wanted Instruction 14 appended
to Instruction 12.
( 5) Instruction 12 and 14 were not formula instructions, but only statements of the theories of each party
and the jury was specifically so advised by the court in
the additional instruction which read "The instructions
(12 and 14) that you asked about do set out the law
applicable to the opposite theories of each party. You
should follow the instruction which you think is supported by the preponderance of the evidence (Additional
Designation to Record. Emphasis added.)

Under these facts, the giving of Instruction 12,
did not constitute prejudicial error.
The basic rule of law is that if the instructions as a
whole present the theories of the parties with fair
accuracy, the trial was fair and the jury verdict supported by substantial evidence, then the verdict will be
affirmed, even though there are errors in the instructions.

6
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Nelson v ....t\..rrowhead Freight Lines, 99 Utah
129, 104 P.2d 225.
Fowler v. Medical Arts Building, 112 Utah 367,
188 P.2d 711, 716-718.
State v. Guerts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12.
Clark v. Los Angeles and Salt Lake R. Co., 73
Utah 486, 275 P. 582.
Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264.
Rule 61, U.R.C.P.
The giving of a "formula" type instruction has
been often considered by the Utah Supreme Court.
While sometimes disapproved of, there has been no
reversal on that ground alone.
Defendant's prime case of Ivie v. Richardson~ 9
Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781, is a recent example. There the
court indicated that a "formula" instruction might confuse the jury, be argumentative, or partial. The court
used mild language- "It is better to avoid giving such
instructions," and went on to say, "Of more importance
is the (next) error assigned . . ." (at 336 P .2d 786) .

Sorenson v. Bell~ 51 Utah 262, 170 P. 72, is similar
and cited with approval in I vie v. Richardson, supra. It
discusses a formula instruction on contributory negligence with a built in error of allowing a verdict against
plaintiff without finding him negligent. Even so, the
court stated, "If the foregoing were the only error complained of, however, we should not, in view of the whole
charge, in which the court more clearly and correctly
stated the rights and duties of deceased, feel inclined to

7
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reverse the judgment. There is however, a further
assignment of error which is more serious."

Cromeenes v. San Pedro L.A. ~ S.L.R. Co.~ 37
Utah 475, 109 P. 10, is a case where a formula instruction omitted contributory negligence although it was
definitely an issue. Verdict for plaintiff was affirmed,
because the instructions as a whole correctly stated the
law. Other Utah cases dealing with formula or formula
type instructions, all of which are in accord with the
above, are:
Toone v. J. P. O'Neil Construction Co., 40 Utah
265, 121 p. 1016.
Morgan v. Mammoth Mining Co., 26 Utah 174,
72 P. 68~.
Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349
(reversed on other grounds) .
Jensen v. Logan City, et al, 89 Utah 347, 373,
57 P.2d 708.
Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah 2d 174, 350 P.2d 154.
The rationale for such decisions is set forth in Morrison v. Perry~ 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, which states
that it is proper to give the jury separate instructions
setting forth the theories and applicable law of each
party, and directing the jury to find for the one supported by proper evidence. The distinction between such
instructions and formula instructions is so narrow, if
extant at all, that it is difficult to approve the one and
reverse the other.

8
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In this case, the judge gave the instructions of each
party. Instruction 12 is plaintiff's requested instruction
No. 9 (R. 10). Instruction 14 is defendant's requested
instruction No. 7 ( R. 27). Each correctly stated the
theory of each party and the judge, presumptively,
coul~ have felt that he had done his full duty, having
also advised the jury to consider the instructions as a
whole, without singling out any one of them ( R. 84) •
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL JUDGE,
IN DENYING DEF'ENDANT'S MOTION
FOR NE'V TRIAL,_ WAS PROPER AND
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Defendant's Motion for New Trial (R. 91, 92),
as argued and briefed for the trial court, was based on
possible confusion of the jury arising from the discrepancy between Instructions 12 and 14, that is that
the jury c01npletely ignored the issue of contributory
negligence in arriving at its verdict.
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts, the
evidence of defendant's negligence was so overwhelming, that contributory negligence and the amount of
datnages were the only real issues in the case. Contributory negligence had been covered in every phase of the
case, ran repeatedly through the Instructions both as
such and on the many· instructions dealing with the
duties <;>f favored drivers, and occupied a great part of
the time of the closing arguments, and again in the
additional instruction (Additional Designation of Rec-

9
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ord), that stated that Instructions 12 and 14 were the
statements of the theories of the parties and were on an
equal footing. Under these circumstances it would be
incredible that contributory negligence could have been
ignored~

The trial judge who was the observer of all the
proceedings squarely met the issue, found no confusion
of the jury, and denied the Motion for New Trial
(R. 93).
In so ruling the trial judge acted within his discretion and should be sustained.
Rule 59, U.R.C.P.
Crellin v. Thomas, supra.
Uptown Appliance Company v. Flint, 122 Utah
298, 240 p .2d 826.
State Road Commission v. Christensen, 13 Utah
2d 224, 371 p .2d 552.
Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, 104 Utah
9, 137 P.2d 374.
Burton v. Z.C.M.I., 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514.
Fox v. Taylor, supra.
Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 153 P.2d
338 (California case dealing with omission of
contributory negligence from "formula" instruction. Held that prejudice in such case
arising from effect of instructions on jury
was matter observable by trial judge, and his
ruling on the point would not be disturbed).

10
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1\NY CL.Al~l OF ERROR Tll.AT DEFEND.A.NT :\liGHT HAVE HAD IN RECAil-D TO INSTRUCTIONS 12 .A.ND 14, HAS
BEEN 'VAlVED BY HIS NEITHER TAKING .AN OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT
SUCH ERROR, NOR OBJECTING TO THE
INSTRUCTION OF THE COURT WHICH
ATTEMPTED TO RECONCILE SUCH INSTRUCTIONS.
When the jury first went out. to deliberate, defendant took his Exceptions to the Instructions, and included an exception to Instruction 12 as being an incomplete "for1nula" instruction. Thereafter, the jury
asked for assistance in reconciling Instructions 12 and
14. The defendant joined with the court and plaintiff in
drafting the explanatory instruction which was given
to the jury, advising them that Instructions 12 and 14
were merely the statements of the theories of the parties,
and that they should be guided in regard to them by
the evidence. The defendant took no exception to this
instruction, stipulated that it be given, and proposed no
alternative. Transcript of this proceeding is included
in the Record on Appeal as the Additional Designation
of Record.
It should be noted in passing that while t~e additional instruction met the problem of an incomplete
"formula", that plaintiff does not necessarily concede
that this was the problem faced by the jury. The Instructions, due to plaintiff's error of omission do not

11
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state that the defendant carried the burden of proof
on contributory negligence. The jury might well have
been wondering if plaintiff had to prove himself not
negligent. This would be difficult because plaintiff was
almost valueless as a witness for himself (R. 357-362,
369-372) . The additional instruction also answer~d this
question by directing the jury to follow the preponderance of the evidence on both instructions.
It is not proper that counsel can, by taking a simple
exception after the jury has been charged, put an error
in his pocket so that he has two chances of winning, by
verdict or by reversal. He has a positive duty to assist
the court and raise his points. 53 Am. Jur. Trial~ Sec.
513, Page 415-416, Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines~
supra~ Palfreyman v. Bates ~ Rogers Construction
Company~ 108.Utah 142, 158 P.2d 132.
If the additional instruction be imperfect, or not
cure the error of which defendant complains, then he
irrevocably put aside his claim of error by stipulating
that it be given, without effort at giving an instruction
which would suit him, and taking no exception thereto.
Rule 47(n}, U.R.C.P.
State v. Kessler, 15 Utah 142, 49 P. 293.
McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d
962.
Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073.
Ludlowv. Los Angeles and Salt Lake Ry. Co.,
73 Utah 513, 275 P. 593.

12
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IIofrichter v. 1\::iewit, Neb., 2:.? NW 2d. 703, 164
A.L.R. 1256.
53 An1. Jur. Trial, Sees. 941-948, pages 667-670.
"IRREGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS" ~I1-\.Y NOT BE USED ON APPEAL
AS A GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL, 'VHEN
SUCH ISSUE HAD NEVER BEEN PUT
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A
RULING.
Defendant's brief at pages 16-20 correctly states
the trial proceedings (T. 133-136), concerning a comment of the court that a police officer who had investigated an automobile accident scene was "an expert in
his own sphere" and, while capable of testifying as to
physical evidence he found, was not capable of evaluating it.
The only action taken by the trial court thereafter,
favored the defendant. On a prompt objection being
taken to the comment, the court immediately advised
the jury to disregard it, and to weigh for themselves
the testimony of the officer ( T. 134-136) .
During the trial, defendant at no time moved for
a mistrial.
After trial, defendant's Motion for New Trial
merely recited Rule 59 (a), U.R.C.P., verbatim and
without any particulars (R. 91, 92). The incident would
come within Rule 59 (a) ( 1) "Irregularity of the Pro-

13
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ceedings . . .", and an explanatory affidavit "shall" be
filed on such ground with the Motion for New Trial.
Rule 59 (c), U.R.C.P. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah
2d 149, 356 P.2d 275. The affidavit was not filed, so this
issue was not before the trial court as a ground for a new
trial, and the record shows no ruling on it. Prejudice
arising from error or irregularity in proceedings is best
decided by the trial judge, who will be reversed only in
case of abuse of discretion, Burton v. Z.C.M.I._, 122
Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514, and such issue must be squarely
presented to him for ruling before it can be used on
appeal. Law v. Smith_, 34 Utah 394, 98 P. 800, State
Road Commis$ion v. Chri$tensen_, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371
P.2d 552.
THE COMMENT OF THE TRIAL
JUbGE CONCE:RNING THE EXPERTNESS
OF OFFICER NEMELKA WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL IN NATURE NOR EFFECT.
Comments on evidence by the trial judge are not
presumptively prejudicial error when they concern facts
not in dispute, or of common knowledge and no prejudice appears. Fox v. Taylor_, 10 Utah 2nd 174, 350
P.2d 154, Federated Milk Producers A.ssn. Inc. v.
Statewide Plumbing and Heating Co._, 11 Utah 2d 295,
358 P.2d 348, Douglas v. Do'ltVall_, 5 Utah 2d 429, 304
P.2d 373.
.
Possibly the reason that no affidavit was filed with
the Motion for New Trial, is that there was no conflict

14
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on the evidence. The court had said "The Court does
believe that this officer is an expert in his own sphere
and I have allowed him to testif.tf as to the solid brake
marks prior to the change in direction. After that point,
I don't believe this officer is trained to evaluate the evidence as he found it." (T. 134). The Court's comment
referred to the brake marks prior to impact, and the
defendant agreed with the officer on that point:
"Q (By Mr. King) All right. Now, the
officer has testified that you left 30 feet of brake
marks before the impact occurred. From your
observation would you say that this was correct?

A

Yes, sir, about." (T. 450)

It is a matter of common knowledge that a police
officer is experienced in accident investigation. Officer
N emelka testified that during 41/2 years l}e had investigated 1500-1600 traffic accidents (T. 102, 113). His
ability to report the physical evidence at the accident
scene was not challenged. He was fully qualified as a
practical expert. Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical
Corp.~ 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094. It is difficult to
see how the court's comment added anything to his stature as a witness, particularly when it was phrased so as
to limit his field of competence, not to enhance it.
No prejudice appears ordinarily when a court
simply advises counsel as to the basis of a ruling, for
the purpose of letting counsel know permissible areas
of examination of a witness. This does not
have
the im·.
pact that a comment put bluntly to the jury for their
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consideration would have. Heitfield v. Benevolent P. 0.
of K.~ 220 P .2d 655 (Wash.), 53 Am. J ur. Trial, Sec.
79. Testimony in this case took four full days. It would
be almost impossible for the court to avoid some reference to the witnesses or testimony in that time. The
problem is comparable to trying to give adequate instructions without reference to facts. Such reference is
permissible. Fox v. Taylor, supra.
After making the comment the court immediately
advised the jury to disregard it and make its own decisions on witnesses and weight of evidence, and then
repeated this in the Instructions (R. 34, 35, 78, 79, 8184). These are correct and adequate ways of curing
problems of this type. Lindsay Land ~ Livestock v.
Smart Land and Livestock~ 43 Utah 554, 137 P. 837.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that no prejudicial
error appears, and that accordingly the verdict of the
jury and denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial
should be affirmed, and plaintiff recover his costs herein.
Respectfully submitted,
K. SAMUEL KING
A. ttorney for Plaintiff
315 East 2nd South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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